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ICONOCLASM AND ICONOPHILIA IN OTHELLO

Catherine E. Winiarski
University of California, Irvine

In his book War Against the Idols, Carlos Eire argues that
iconoclastic resistance to the Medieval Catholic Church began with
the gentle scolding of Erasmus and ended as the "shibboleth" of
radical Calvinism.1 The use of images in religious instruction and
practice was one of the major points of dispute between Protestant
reformers and Catholic counter-reformers.
Iconoclasm was
certainly not confined to radical Calvinism; Anglican reformers,
especially those who had spent time in continental Europe as exiles
(like John Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury), quickly raised the issue in
their country, which had its own unique history of religious reform.
The discussions of image and idolatry in Calvin and Jewel
represent particular theories of the image that derive from but also
revise ancient Platonic theories of the image. Reformation
iconoclasm brings up issues of ontology (who or what is God?),
epistemology (by what means are we to know him? Can he be
represented to human senses?), and ethics (how does knowledge of
God translate into moral action?). Protestant iconoclasts tend to
emphasize the epistemological worth (or rather, worthlessness) of
1See Carlos Eire, War Against the Idols: The Reformation of Worship from
Erasmus to Calvin. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986).
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religious imagery, while the Catholic iconophiles emphasize the
positive moral effects to be derived from the use of images in
religious instruction.
Although sparked in the 1520's and 30's, the debate
between iconoclasts and iconophiles raged throughout the latter
sixteenth century, well into Shakespeare's time. The iconoclastic
writings of Zwingli and Calvin had a powerful legacy throughout
Europe. Calvin's collected Institutes of the Christian Religion was
published in 1559. Perhaps spurred by theological arguments like
Calvin's, violent stripping of church imagery and other popular
agitation over idolatry took place in Switzerland and elsewhere on
the continent. In England, John Jewel's dialogues with Dr.
Harding on the subject of imagery, drawing very much on Calvin's
arguments, were published in 1565 and again in 1611. During the
English Reformation, the churches and monasteries of England
were also stripped of their images by some Protestant objectors. It
is clear that iconoclasm was an issue not only for elite churchmen-it also captured the hearts and minds of the general population,
who were the audience of Shakespeare's theater.
The problem of the image is traced, by many Protestant
theologians, to several major scriptural conflicts. The first
important reference is God's pronouncement in Genesis: "Let us
make man in our image according to our likenes" (Genesis 1:26).2
Gilles Deleuze describes how this conception of humanity's origin
was combined with the Platonic theory of ideas in the Christian
catechism: "God made man in his image and resemblance.
Through sin, however, man lost the resemblance while maintaining
the image. We have become simulacra."3 After the Fall, humanity
became like the painting of a bed in Plato's Republic--a copy of a
copy. The Catholic Church, at least after the second council at
Nicea, inferred that images of Christ and the saints could be
2 All references to the Bible are to The Geneva Bible: A Facsimile of the 1560
Edition. Madison, Milwaukee, and London: U of Wisconsin P, 1969. This version was
in many ways inflected by the iconoclastic thought of its English Calvinist translators.
3Gilles Deleuze, “The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy." The Logic of
Sense. (New York: Columbia UP, 1992) 257-8.
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therapeutic for the Christian seeking to restore himself to God's
image. Yet, God's prohibition of image-making seems quite
categorical in the second commandment: "Thou shalt make thee
no graven image, nether anie similitude of things that are in heaven
above, nether that are in the earth beneth, nor that are in the waters
under the earth" (Exodus 20:4). This commandment forms the
foundation of the Protestant resistance to religious iconography,
resistance which begins on the continent with Calvin and emerges
slightly later in England with Jewel and Harding.
Harding provides one justification for the use of images
with a quotation from St. Basil: "I reverence also the holy apostles,
prophets, and martyrs, which make supplication to God for me;
that by their mediation our most benign God be merciful unto me,
and grant me freely remission of my sins. For which cause I do
both honour the stories of their images and openly adore them."4
First of all, a concept of mediation is permitted in this account,
where none is recognized in Calvin. The ontological distinction
between God and his believers is not absolute. Saints and martyrs,
as well as their images, can mediate between the human and the
divine without threatening the hierarchy of beings. This order is
structured more like a system of feudal vassalage than an absolute
monarchy. And the mediating figures are able to multiply the
power of prayer for the human believer. Thus, they create a social
connection between the believer and an absent God. Such notions
of "society" between God and believers are far more important in
the iconophilic arguments than in the iconoclastic ones, where
epistemological concerns have priority.
Harding offers up three psychological reasons why images
have been approved in the Catholic Church: as conduits of
Christian knowledge, as spurs to Christian behavior, and as aids to
memory. Images, he says, permit the illiterate common people to
acquire necessary knowledge of the deeds of Christ and the saints.
Representations of these deeds summarily "quicken and move [the
mind] to the like will of doing and suffering, and to all endeavor of
4Cited in John Jewel, "The Adoration of Images" in The Works of John Jewel.
Ed. John Ayre, The Parker Society (New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1968) 2: 657.
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holy and virtuous life."5 Finally, images maintain the stirring
memory of Christ and the saints in the mind, which, he says, is
naturally prone to forgetting. Thus, images are valuable not only
for the knowledge they provide of divine subjects--they also
compel the viewer to act in their image. A praxis, rather than an
ideology, is most at stake in this argument. Like the Catholic
theologians cited by Calvin, Harding sees an ethics implied in the
descriptive stories of scripture; representations of the life of Christ
or the saints will necessarily compel the viewer to imitate those
lives.
Harding does not make the enormous ontological and moral
distinction between language and sight, word and image that the
iconoclasts do. He demonstrates an equivocal position on this
point: "[t]hus the use and profit of writing and of pictures is one.
For things that be read, when as they come to our ears, then we
convey them over to the mind; and the things that we behold in
pictures with our eyes, the same also do we embrace with the
mind. And so by these two, reading and painting, we achieve one
like benefit of knowledge."6 He insists on a fundamental
distinction between signifier and signified in religious symbolism,
the distinction that Calvin resists. He says, "As for the holy
images, to them we do not attribute that worship at all, but an
inferior reverence or adoration ... The whole act whereof is
notwithstanding referred not to the images principally, but to the
things by them represented, as being the true and proper objects of
such worship."7 Worship thus passes through the mediating
representations to the originals, to the signifiers. The gazer "defers
to Christ" when beholding the image of Christ. Harding maintains
the distinction between idolodoulia (service) and idolatria
(worship)--an inferior and superior worship, one for the image, the
other for the original.

5Cited in Jewel, 661.
6Ibid. 660.
7Ibid., 662.
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Jewel's rebuttal to Harding very closely resembles Calvin's
iconoclastic argument in the Institutes. Indeed, Jewel spent some
of his time in exile in Calvinist Zürich, before becoming one of the
major players in the Protestant Revolution of 1559 under Elizabeth
and subsequently, one of her new bishops. One of Jewel's replies
to Harding is from St. Paul: "Fides ex auditu." Jewel translates
this as 'Faith cometh (not by seeing or gazing, but) by hearing.'"8
Although Paul does not explicitly exclude "seeing" and "gazing" as
modes of conversion, Jewel infers that he does. A clear hierarchy
of the senses is set up here, sight being the medium of bad
influence, hearing that of good influence. Jewel suggests that the
effect of spectacle may be not to stir up appropriate Christian
ethics but rather "concupiscence." Images are only a temptation to
sensual desires. Jewel himself says that "every thing that may
delight or move the mind is not therefore meet for the church of
God. God's house is a house of prayer, and not of gazing."9 Thus,
he draws a strict distinction between the secular realm and the
divine through a distinction between sight and word.
Jewel dismisses the latria/doulia distinction used by
Harding and the iconophiles as a logical contradiction: "[a]n
image may be worshipped; and yet it may not be worshipped."10
He contends that the latria/doulia distinction "standeth not in
difference of matter, but only in words."11 Here, Jewel claims, the
Catholics rely on the effect of signification created by the word
doulia, rather than the grasp of a real, external referent. They rely
on empty signifiers. Jewel also quotes Augustine, who warns
about the deceptiveness of the image: "although [images] have
neither sense nor soul, yet they so strike and amaze the weak
minds of people, even with the very proportion of living members
8Rom. x, cited in Jewel, 661.
9Jewel, 662.
10Ibid. 664.
11Ibid. 666.
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and senses, that they seem to have life and to draw breath."12
Mimesis itself is given a negative moral valence, as it was in Plato,
but on different grounds. We are liable to mistake the signifier for
the signified, to infer all of the characteristics of life in something
that bears only some. We are doomed to make a double out of an
image. As Lowell Gallagher has written, "Jewel reinscribes a
relation of language and referent that makes idolatry, the seduction
of the double, an ineradicable threat and iconoclasm the
interminable response."13
The Puritan anti-theatrical campaigns of late sixteenthcentury England provide an intermediate connection between
Shakespearean drama and Reformation iconoclasm. Many of the
influential anti-theatrical pamphlets of the 1570's and 80's, like
those by Stephen Gosson and Phillip Stubbes, rely on the same
argument that the Reformation iconoclasts employ—that sensuous
images enflame the viewer's material desires and keep him from
the care of the immaterial soul. Gosson writes in The School of
Abuse:
those wanton spectacles of light huswives drawing gods from
the heavens, and young men from themselves to shipwracke of
honesty, wil hurt them more then if at the epicures table they
had burst their guts with over feeding. For if the bodie be
overcharged, it may bee holpe, but the surfite of the soule is
hardely cured.14

It is worth noting that many iconoclastic arguments were
themselves implicitly anti-theatrical. Huston Diehl notes that
iconoclastic arguments often condemn the Catholic liturgy merely

12Cited in Jewel, 665.
13'Lowell Gallagher, “’This seal-d-up Oracle': Ambivalent Nostalgia in The
Winter's Tale” Exemplaria 7.2 (1995): 477.
14Stephen Gosson, The School of Abuse. (London: Reprinted for the
Shakespeare Society, 1841) 20.
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by comparing it to a stage spectacle.15 Thus, there are quite a few
reasons to believe that the iconoclastic debate was extremely close
to Shakespeare's concerns as a theatrical image-maker and that
debate may have found expression in his works. But, as many
have suggested, it would be a mistake to assume that Shakespeare
would simply defend image-making against iconoclastic attacks.
Laura Levine suggests that "the playwright is as 'contaminated' by
the anxieties of the [anti-theatrical] attacks which we think of him
as 'defending' against as the attackers are themselves."16
Shakespeare, we can expect, will offer much more than an
iconophilic rebuttal of iconoclasm.
As a possible instance of this type of engagement with
theological debates over the status of the image, what does
Shakespeare's Othello do to contribute to the debate? I would
argue that by way of the ancient analogy between religious and
marital devotion, Shakespeare presents these two theological
positions (iconoclasm and iconophilia) in the characters of
Desdemona and Othello. The analogy, used by Tertullian and
Calvin, came from a perceived symmetry between the first half of
the Ten Commandments and the second. The injunction against
image-making (the second commandment) was matched with the
injunction against adultery (the seventh). As Margaret Aston notes
in her book on English iconoclasts, idolatry was regarded as
"spiritual whoredom."17
On this basis, I read Othello and Desdemona's marriage as
a figure for the believer's devotion to God. Desdemona's
relationship to Othello figures one sort of relationship between the
believer and the divine; Othello's relationship to Desdemona
figures another. In telling the tragic story of Othello and
Desdemona’s marriage, Shakespeare creates a representation (or
15Huston Diehl, Staging Reform, Reforming the Stage. (Ithaca: Cornell UP,
1997) 25.
16Laura Levine, Men in Women's Clothing: Anti-Theatricality and
Effeminization, 1579-1642. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994) 2.
17England's Iconoclasts. Volume 1: Laws Against Images. (Oxford:
Clarendon P, 1988) 468.
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icon) of the conflict between iconoclasm and iconophilia.
Ironically, it is iconophilia that is charged with the most
destruction.
Desdemona clearly represents an iconoclastic position. She
refuses to read in Othello's dark skin (part of the material form he
presents to the world) an evil or impure nature. She says, "I saw
Othello's visage in his mind" (1.3.253).18 Rather than seeing his
(invisible) mind in his (visible) image, she forms an "image" of
him based on her contemplation of his mind. She entirely reverses
the syntax of an iconophilic argument, which would understand the
abstract in the image. Desdemona proclaims it is "to his honours
and his valiant parts / Did I my soul and fortunes consecrate"
(1.3.254-5). She conceives of Othello exactly as the iconoclastic
preachers urged Christians to contemplate God--through abstract
properties, rather than sensuous images. English iconoclast
William Perkins, in his Warning Against Idolatry, claims that "the
right way to conceive God, is not to conceive any form: but to
conceive in mind his properties and proper effects."19 Desdemona
does exactly this. And the religious language she employs—
references to the soul and consecration of the soul—direct us
towards this theological reading. Most notably, Desdemona is won
by Othello ("converted" to belief, according to the parallel we are
following) by his personal story (the word), rather than by sight.
For her, faith does come by hearing rather than gazing.
Against Desdemona's iconoclastic position, Othello
represents the iconophilic position—and his tragic fall shows the
perils of that position. He relies on sensuous images to connect
him to the abstract—he cannot bear the possibility that
Desdemona's honor might be, as Iago asserts, "an essence that's not
seen" (4.1.16). He relies on her body to tell him about her
character and soul, as the iconophilic believer might rely on
religious imagery to tell him or her about the nature of God. And
so, for Othello, Desdemona's perceptible beauty denotes
18All references to Othello are to the Arden edition, ed. E.A.J. Honigmann
(London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1999).
19Cited in Aston, 453.
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imperceptible goodness. Othello is caught, it seems, within a
conventional iconographic or emblematic system in which colors
and other sensual qualities are associated with particular qualities
in a very rigid way: whiteness denotes purity, coldness denotes
chastity, heat and moisture denote lust and evil.
These
correspondences have a sort of divine imperative in Othello's
mind; as he comes under the spell of jealousy, he exclaims, "was
this fair paper, this most goodly book / Made to write 'whore'
upon?" (4.2.72-3). For him, material things like the body are
"made" by some divine author to carry certain meanings. Othello
cannot come into contact with these abstract qualities except
through his sensual perception. Desdemona is the vehicle through
which Othello contacts not only abstract qualities but divinity
itself: he says, "if she be false, O then heaven mocks itself"
(3.3.282). God has sent her down as his representative, and all that
she is reflects back on divinity itself. As his jealous rage
compounds, Othello gives signifying power not only to
Desdemona's physical qualities, but also to objects simply
associated with her metonymically, like the handkerchief. It
becomes the very substance of her honor: the handkerchief in
Cassio's hand is an absolutely certain sign, to Othello, that Cassio
has possessed Desdemona herself.
Othello's iconophilic tendency is very well represented in
his musings over what kind of death to inflict on Desdemona. He
becomes obsessed with making the punishment signify the crime.
At first he thinks to poison her, but Iago suggests a more artful
death: "Do it not with poison, strangle her in her bed—even the
bed she hath contaminated" (4.1.204-5). Othello replies, "Good,
good, the justice of it pleases; very good!" (4.2.206-7). A woman
punished at the very site of her crime, purifying with her death the
bed she contaminated with lust, is a pleasing image to Othello; it
seems to represent the very concept of justice, the equivalence
between crime and punishment. Desdemona's supposed adultery
(the crime) had opened up a passageway in the body illicitly;
strangulation (the punishment) would then close off a passageway.
The punishment here is an image, in reverse, of the crime.
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Othello changes his mind about the method of execution
but the determination to express the crime in the punishment
remains: he says "thy bed, lust-stained, shall with lust's blood be
spotted" (5.1.36). Blood, the material representative of immaterial
lust, will be shed and exposed to sight; exposed in this way, the
blood will be able to represent the hidden crime. An invisible
essence will be made visible. But Othello ultimately relents from
this plan. In his soliloquy in Act 5, he says, "I'll not shed her blood
/ Nor scar that whiter skin of hers than snow / and smooth as
monumental alabaster: Yet she must die" (5.2.3-5).
Why does he finally choose a bloodless death for
Desdemona over a bloody one? Indeed, he reverses the logic of
the bloody plan—rather than making her chaste appearance (white,
smooth, and cold) fit her supposed lustful essence by exposing her
hot, red blood to sight, he elects to try to make her white, cold,
dead body express chastity again. Othello undertakes this in the
name of "the cause"—a lofty abstraction that goes unnamed.
Perhaps it cannot be named because it must be shown. Othello
intervenes here, as an agent in the signifying order of nature, to
make Desdemona once again embody that ultimate quality he
believes she has lost. He chastens her with death. Death fixes in
her those qualities of stoniness and coldness which denote chastity
in his iconographic system. The best image of chastity is her dead
body. When it is discovered that she really was chaste all along,
the iconographic power of the scene is only enhanced for Othello:
"cold, cold, my girl / Even like thy chastity" (5.2.273-4).
Othello's iconophilic impulses reach a zenith in his staging
of his own death. Here, he adds himself to the scene of pathos he
has just created. His final speech and gestures present symmetrical
images of love and destruction that seem designed to represent
tragic pathos itself. His last words are, "I kissed thee ere I killed
thee: no way but this, / Killing myself, to die upon a kiss"
(5.2.355-6).
Here, two kisses frame two killings in a beautifully
symmetrical way. A kiss before a killing and then a killing before
a kiss. First, the tragic hero destroys what he loves ("I kissed thee
ere I killed thee"); then, after tragic reversal and recognition occur,
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the hero now destroys himself to love his beloved once again
("dying upon a kiss"). Othello again makes the scene of
punishment express the crime: the unbloodied body of Desdemona
(expressing her innocence and chastity) is embraced by the bloody
body of Othello (expressing his vice and guilt). The scene is an
image of innocence destroyed by vicious rage, and then vicious
rage turned on itself in tragic regret. Perhaps Othello is trying to
mold an image of tragedy itself. In any event, Othello is an imagemaker par excellence, making icons of Desdemona's body and his
own. Ultimately, it is dead bodies that have the most profound
signifying power for him. Here I think we can see the danger of
the iconophilic impulse in contrast with the iconoclastic-iconophilia kills things in order to make them fixed and reliable
signifiers. Othello thus may be part of the Protestant critique of
Catholic and/or pagan iconophilia.
To conclude, I would like to pose a hypothesis concerning
the Indian/Judean crux in Act 5 of Othello, specifically on the
possible value of viewing this textual controversy through the lens
of the iconophilic/iconoclastic debate described here. Othello of
the first Quarto speaks this line in his final speech: "speak ... of
one whose hand, / Like the base Indian, threw a pearl away /
Richer than all his tribe" (5.2.341-6). Othello of the first Folio
refers to a "base Judean." Which line is to be taken as
authoritative? Readers and editors have been trying to solve this
textual problem for years, making arguments based on cultural
commonplaces about Indians and Judeans in Shakespeare's time;
based on Shakespeare's discussion of Indians, Judeans, and pearls
in other plays; or based on the immediate context of the line in the
play itself.20
I would like to suggest a synchronic reading of both
variants, following those editors and critics who have conceded
that there is no authoritative text of Shakespeare to be discovered
or reasoned out. In this synchronic reading, the Indian might
20For two notable opposing arguments, see J.O. Holmer, "Othello's Threnos:
'Arabian trees' and 'Indian' Versus 'Judean'," Shakespeare Studies 13 (1980): 145-67, and
Richard Levin, "The Indian/Iudean Crux in Othello," Shakespeare Quarterly 33 (1982):
60-7.
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function as a figure for extreme iconophilia. The Indians were
widely vilified by Christians during Shakespeare's time and earlier
for their supposed worship of images. The Judeans, on the other
hand, might be a figure for extreme iconoclasm. Both groups are
regarded as having thrown away Christ, the "pearl of great price."
The reasons for this denial are, of course, quite different on each
side. While Christ might not be categorically excluded from the
pantheon in Hinduism, he would hold no special status above
Vishnu, Shiva, and the other many avatars of the divine. In such
an abundance of pearls, one single pearl loses its value. In
Judaism, Christ would have to be denied on the ground of his
competition with the one and only God of the first commandment.
In an environment of polytheism, Christ would be an
undistinguished god. In an environment of firm monotheism, he
would be an idol.
It can be argued that Christianity, and more specifically
Protestant Christianity, is suspended between pagan iconophilia
and Judaic iconoclasm, just as Shakespeare's text seems to be
suspended between "Indian" and "Judean." The Christian God is
not as abstract as the Judaic God but not as concrete, particular,
and polymorphous as the Indian God. In her book about the
treatment of pagan and Judaic narratives and symbols in the
Renaissance, Julia Reinhard Lupton argues that
[i]n the Reformation, Protestant faiths constituted themselves
as the repetition of [the] sublime injunction [against images]
by projecting the Church's reliance on images and ceremony
as an insidious resurgence of paganism.21

Indeed, Reformation Protestantism seemed to strive for a more
Hebraic Christianity in many ways. But their iconoclastic logic
had to have a limit. Christianity still had to recognize Christ as the
image (the one and only image) of God. And thus Christianity
finds itself defined by its suspension between the poles of
polytheism and monotheism, between Indian and Judean.
21Julia Reinhard Lupton, The Afterlives of the Saints. (Stanford: Stanford UP,
1996) 179.
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(Editor’s choice)
from Leonard Digges, commendatory verses for the

First Folio

So have I seen, when Cesar would appeare,
And on the Stage at halfe-sword parley were,
Brutus and Cassius: oh how the Audience,
Were ravish’d, with what wonder they went thence,
When some new day they would not brooke a line,
Of tedious (though well laboured) Catilines;
Sejanus too was irksome; they priz’de more
Honest Iago, or the jealous Moore.

Cited in Andrew Gurr, Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London, 3rd ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 280.

